Last night I went to a discussion on the future of globalisation featuring the BBC’s roving man in a white suit Humphrey Hawksley, Time reporter Alex Perry and French egghead Dominique Moïsi, as part of Glasgow’s cringe-inducing ‘Aye Write!’ book festival. The debate has moved on a bit since those heady post-Berlin Wall days when excitable chaps like Thomas Friedman raved about being able to buy Big Macs that tasted exactly the same in Greenland as in Timbuktu, and when foolish futurologist Francis Fukuyama hailed “the end of history”. History, of course, came back with a vengeance, and now all the talk is of the relative decline of the West and the return to the early modern period when Asian civilisations were globally dominant. US-led globalisation in the noughties was a victim both of its own success (in lifting hundreds of millions of people in Asia out of poverty) and its failure (9/11, Iraq, climate change, credit crunch, etc). If there is a defining feeling today, it is that we in Europe, and to a lesser extent America, are like those Mesoamerican tribes chasing each other through the jungle in rags in Mel Gibson’s hilarious romp Apocalypto, before stumbling onto the beach to the incredible sight of the massing Spanish galleons that would put their own squabbles into some perspective. As you know, I’m firmly in this “we’re finished” camp. No-one in India or China sits around writing ululating blogs like this.
Moïsi, halfway between Said and Huntington, argued for a new cultural understanding between West, East and Middle East, languidly positing that the great divisive forces today are emotional rather than economic. Hawksley and Perry were more practical, arguing that the West’s imposition of instant democracy (or IMFocracy) has often been worse than useless and that many countries at the lower levels of development are better off with benevolent dictators: neo-Hobbesian princes like Paul Kagame and Lee Kuan Yew. Certainly, Rwanda is joining Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore as countries who’ve developed impressively from war and poverty through enlightened despotism, with democracy an afterthought. I asked the panel whether this argument might give a figleaf to regimes, like the al-Sauds and the Castros, who don’t want democracy because it’s a threat to their own power, rather than because it’s supposedly unsuitable for their stage of development. Perry ummed and erred and admitted I’d hit the nail on the head; Hawksley didn’t even try to answer; Moïsi proffered a Gallic shrug from his ivory tower. For every benevolent dictator there are a dozen malevolent ones; for every Kagame or Lee there are plenty of Mugabes, Amins and Kims Jong-il.
I haven’t been to Africa or to Taiwan or Korea, but I can certify that Singapore presents a huge challenge to anyone who instinctively believes in the moral and practical supremacy of liberal democracy. Here is a country – or, rather, a city-state like old republican Venice – that had an African standard of living at the end of WWII and is today a beacon of trade and civilisation. Yes, it helps that they are an entrepôt perfectly situated at one of the world’s prime crossroads for mercantile activity; yes, they have the advantage that any addition to their infrastructure, in such a small place, automatically benefits almost everyone, and unlike Londoners they don’t have to pay for the upkeep of a ruinous hinterland. But look at their achievements, without democracy: the streets are spotless, transport and healthcare make ours seem even more embarrassing than they do anyway, the people are universally hard-working, well-educated, and don’t run around shooting, knifing and swearing at each other. Under a soft, subtle authoritarianism they’ve willed not just the ends of a civilised society, but the means: they’ve won their wars on drugs and crime by caning criminals and killing drug dealers, and unlike Dubai there are very few signs of either extreme of selfish wealth or hopeless poverty. They have a wonderful, vibrant melting pot, but without the bombs going off. There are plenty of immigrants and a mix of cultures and languages, but all children wear uniforms, sing the national anthem and pledge allegiance to the country at school each morning. We scoff at such things, fooling ourselves that we are more sophisticated, but look at the results. Compare it to the mess our individualism has brought us to: yes, left and right, that means both of you. As Hawksley pointed out, for the 99% of people who play by the rules, the system works. The rest of the world should stand in awe of Singapore’s works.
Where does this leave China and India? The panel pointed out that, beyond the glittering façades of Bangalore and Shanghai, both countries are hamstrung by some pretty epic social and environmental problems: the unreported Naxalite war in India (all the violence of Veerappan, not much of the Robin Hood charm), casino capitalism in Shenzhen, and massive corruption, inequality and gendercide in both countries. Before democracy can take hold in China, the rule of law and property rights have to be established much more firmly. This is the mistake we made in Iraq: to imagine that elections alone, in the absence of those criteria and of civil institutions like a free press, would transform a country buggered by dictatorship, war and anarchy into a functioning liberal democracy overnight. In China, then, we should agitate not for the end of the party but for the end of its abuses. But would India have been better off by beginning as a dictatorship than a democracy? I doubt they could have arrived at a dictator as enlightened as Nehru – and, even now, the relative dispersal of power and information there gives them an advantage in solving their great problems that China lacks.
But Lee Kuan Yew is a hero in China. If that country, on a huge scale, can replicate what he achieved on a small one – then the world will deservedly be theirs, and we will either go the way of the Mayan and the Inca, or, if we are lucky, end our days as tour guides in the museum of Europe.

I must respectively disagree with your analysis of the present world situation. The slow death of the American Empire by no means represents the death of the distinctively European synthesis of social welfare and individualism, combined with strongly democratic institutions. I would like to make two predictions:
(1) Within the next fifteen years, the Chinese government will collapse.
(2) Within fifty years, the centre of world political gravity will be a unified European state.
Let me outline my rationale for these two points:
(1) The Chinese government is beset by massive developing internal problems. The intense polarization of society into a rich oligarchy and a huge poor population, along with a developing bottleneck in raw materials production, has replicated a consistent cyclical trend in Chinese history (the first name that comes to mind in analysis of this is Peter Turchin, who applied his statistical theory of cliodynamics to Chinese history and found a fairly obvious trend of cycles in China). The Chinese Empire, which is attempting an intriguing form of neo-colonialism in Africa, has great domestic political problems, marked by the rise of the “Communist Youth League”/”League of Princes” faction of the CCP. The Chinese government has shown itself repeatedly unable to exert any control over the Chinese economy and indeed, on a broad scale, Chinese society (one Beijinger memorably said to me that “the leaders like to come up with shit slogans”, but “no one cares”), and this poses the serious (and in my view virtually inevitable) risk of the situation spiralling out of control.
I would argue that an opaque authoritarian system such as China’s breeds corruption and ineffectuality. It is better for differences to be flaunted in the open, under public scrutiny, as in Western democracies, than for them to be commuted into never-ending political intrigues between invisible cliques and factions as in China (and in practically every similar political system in the world).
(2) Europe exerts massive cultural influence, it has a remarkably successful socio-political system, and has direct political influence over huge swathes of the world. In continental Europe at least, a growing European consciousness is developing, and European governance is being expanded and consolidated at a remarkable and accelerating rate. The present Euro crisis will merely serve to galvanize the resolve of the Eurocracy to create a firm and stable system which can easily resolve itself into final political unity. As America declines, and the situation elsewhere deteriorates, Europe has the potential to emerge as the consistent pole of world stability.
The form of defeatism you seem to espouse reminds me more than anything of the defeatism of the Western intelligentsia in the 1950s and 1960s, when the threat of Soviet communism seemed insuperable. In a similar way, the tensions of the “rising” East are partially hidden by the shroud of authoritarianism, but will make themselves known (most likely, in my view in spectacular fashion) soon enough.
2012 will see the end of Hu Jintao’s term as President of China. This will be the first real test of the Chinese system in the modern world you describe. From my observance of the Chinese system from inside and outside for years now, I believe it is one it shall fail, and we shall see the hardline tendency of the Communist Party take back control of China and steer it towards destruction.
(I do recognize that this is not mainstream opinion but then again mainstream opinion has very rarely been correct in predicting the turns of geopolitics — and I suspect that there will be many unforeseeable developments in the future that will prove both myself and your predictions wrong! All we can do is extrapolate the present, and as we have been shown so many times, that can never ultimately work. However all I am claiming is that I have a higher probability of being correct in my predictions, assuming no major unforeseen shifts.)
[...] Zombie Bagehot this week gives a good summary of the Spirit Level debate. As he points out, Singapore seems a grievous omission. With a population the same size as Scotland’s and inequality if [...]